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R808requires endonucleolytic cleavage of
crosslinks to initiate DSB responses.
This difference and the requirement
for different protein complexes during
the initial recognition of each lesion
could potentially account for the
specific requirement for BRCA1 E3
ligase activity in the context of
topoisomerase inhibitor-induced
DSBs. It is interesting to note that
differential requirements for BRCA1 are
observed in response to poly(ADP)
ribose polymerase inhibitors and ICL
agents in mouse cells [17], thus
invoking different BRCA1-dependent
mechanisms to each response.
While the findings from this study
await further investigation in additional
cell lines and in vivo systems, they have
several potential clinical implications.
For example, BRCA1 mutant tumors
may respond differently to
topisomerase inhibitors in comparison
to ICL agents in a manner that depends
on where the BRCA1 mutation is
located. Additionally, resistance
mechanisms to each agent in tumors
may not be equivalent. Finally, the
studies by Sato et al. [12] emphasize
the power of genetic systems to
uncover additional complexity within
cellular DNA damage responses and
our ever-evolving understanding of
how BRCA1 contributes to this
process.
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Weighs the EvidenceThe brain has to weigh incoming sensory evidence against prior beliefs, the
relative weight given to each depending on the relative uncertainties.
Neuroscience now shows how the human brain accomplishes this.Mathieu d’Acremont
and Peter Bossaerts
Decisions are based on a combination
of prior beliefs and evidence: the
latter should be weighted to a greater
extent if one is more uncertain about
the former, and vice versa. In this
issue of Current Biology, Vilares et al.
[1] report experiments involving
a task where perceptual evidence hadto be evaluated appropriately
against prior beliefs. These
experiments have provided
fascinating new insight into the neural
processing behind sophisticated
human reasoning. They show how the
human brain encodes the signals that
are needed to optimally merge
available evidence with prior beliefs in
order to reach a well-informed
decision.Vilares et al. [1] studied a situation
like the following. Imagine you are
playing a guessing game with your
friends Bill and Betty. Bill will throw
a gold coin in the middle of a murky
pond. Betty sees where it landed, but
you do not. You are to guess where the
gold coin is. Betty will help you by
tossing three silver coins in the
direction of Bill’s coin. She will show
you where her coins landed (Figure 1).
To be good at this guessing game,
you primarily need to track how good
Bill and Betty are at coin tossing. If Bill
isn’t good and his coin could land
anywhere despite his aiming for the
middle, while Betty is likely to match
Bill’s toss, then you should relymore on
the evidence Betty shows. Conversely,
if Betty is lousy at coin tossing, while
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Figure 1. Coin tossing game.
Bill aims at the center of the pond and throws a gold coin first. Then Betty throws several silver
coins, aiming for the gold coin. The game is to guess the position of the gold coin when one
only observes Betty’s silver coins.
Dispatch
R809Bill is good, you would want to bias
your guess towards what you know Bill
aimed at: the middle of the pond.
In all cases, you weigh your prior
belief about the true coin location after
Bill’s coin throw with the evidence
based on Betty’s tosses. Weights
depend on how uncertain you are
about Betty’s ability to match the true
location of Bill’s coin relative to Bill’s
skill in throwing his coin to themiddle of
the pond. That is, optimal guesses
depend on the combination of prior
beliefs (about Bill) with the evidence
(that Betty generates) based on the
relative uncertainty.
In a stylized version of this guessing
game, Vilares et al. [1] show that
humans indeed let their decisions be
informed by the relative uncertainty
of Bill’s and Betty’s coin throwing
abilities. Little is known, however,
about the neural mechanisms that lead
to the observed choices in this
perceptual decision game: specifically,
how is relative uncertainty encoded?
There are a number of ways one can
imagine that the brain encodes
uncertainties. This includes a popular
idea, which posits that uncertainty
need not be encoded explicitly.
According to this co-localization
hypothesis [2,3], uncertainty is
implicitly encoded through the
precision of the signal generated by
the collective activation of an ensemble
of neurons. Diametrically opposed is
the idea that uncertainty is encoded
separately, and activation of neurons
specialized in tracking uncertainty
inhibits or excites output from neurons
elsewhere that express the prior belief
or the observed evidence. This
hypothesis is inspired by tasks
requiring choices among different
gambles, where uncertainty has been
found to be encoded separately from
expected reward [4,5]. Finally,
uncertainties about prior beliefs and
about evidence may be tracked
separately too, rather than merged
into one neural weighting signal.
Using functionalmagnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI), Vilares et al. [1]
discovered that uncertainty about
perceptual evidence is located in the
same brain regions that process the
perceptual evidence in the first place
(the visuomotor regions), while
uncertainty about prior beliefs is
encoded in a range of frontal cortical
regions (insula, orbito-frontal cortex)
and sub-cortical (putamen, amygdala)
regions.Interestingly, the identification of an
fMRI signal correlating with evidence
uncertainty in the regions processing
the perceptual evidence is compatible
with the idea that uncertainty is
co-localized. Uncertainty about prior
beliefs is differentially localized in
non-perceptual brain regions, generally
known to be involved in executive
control, and in particular, in tracking of
reward and risk when choosing
between gambles.
These findings constitute a
significant step towards uncovering the
neural mechanism behind human belief
formation. Subsequent steps include
studying the neural representation
of beliefs themselves — of the
probabilities that subjects assigned to
all contingencies [6]. Where is the prior
probability encoded that the gold coin
has landed in a given area of the pool?
Where are the probabilities based
solely on the evidence from Betty’s
silver coins? Another important
question for future research is how
the probabilities (beliefs) are updated,
one coin toss at a time. Is the updating
optimal — does it conform to Bayes’
law [7], and if so, how does the brain
accomplish this?
Further research is also needed to
determine to what extent the results of
Vilares et al. [1] generalize to other
settings. Very different brain activation
may ensue when presentation of
information is altered. For example, the
authors told subjects only that Bill’sability to toss gold coins changed from
one block of trials to another, but not by
how much. As such, subjects needed
experience to form correct prior beliefs.
Alternatively, Vilares et al. [1] could
have provided explicit, verbal
information, for example: ‘‘Bill’s gold
coin on average lands 30 cm from the
middle’’. Prior belief uncertainty may
then be encoded in a different way
because verbal information would
engage the semantic memory system
[8], while learning by experience
recruits the episodic memory
system [9].
The reader may be familiar with tasks
on learning to predict uncertain
rewards (or avoiding stochastic
losses). Major progress has been
made towards understanding the
underlying neural processes [10–14].
One question is whether the coin
tossing task in [1] is different in some
important respect. It is, because the
events about which subjects were
asked to express beliefs had no value
to the subject per se. Whether Bill’s
gold coin was more likely to land on the
edge of the pond did not change
subjects’ rewards. As such, belief
formation and valuation were
dissociated. In reward learning tasks,
instead, the two are confounded. The
coin-tossing analog of a typical reward
learning task would be to pay the
subject depending on where Bill’s gold
coin landed. There, the events (Bill’s
coin throws) directly entail value.
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started to discover the neural
mechanisms of formation of beliefs
about stimuli (in their case, coin tosses)
that are devoid of value themselves.
We would argue that this represents an
important aspect of typical learning
tasks humans are exposed to and that
unfortunately has been neglected in the
reward learning literature. Indeed,
humans routinely have to predict
events (for example, snow) before
knowing what opportunities (skiing;
driving), and hence, what value (fun;
danger) these events will entail.
Classical conditioning theories such as
reinforcement learning cannot readily
deal with such situations.
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